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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the prevalence of earnings management between
government linked companies (GLCs) and Chinese family linked
companies (CFLCs). Information on twenty five companies from each
ownership structure were collected, for the years 2004 to 2005.The
findings reveal that GLCs have a tendency to manage their earnings
upwards while CFLCs tend to adjust their earnings downwards. On
average, GLCs appear to have a higher level of earnings management
as compared to CFLCs. There is a weak evidence to show that the
concentration of shareholdings in GLCs affect the extent of earnings
management. This is however not observed among CFLCs. In general
our results do not support the belief that higher concentration of
shareholdings results in increased earnings management.
Keywords:
INTRODUCTION
Earnings management has always been of great interest and a popular area of
research among academicians. However, most research on earnings management
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has been mostly conducted in US and other more developed countries. It is
undeniable that US is generally viewed as having the most rigorous and
comprehensive financial reporting standards in the world (Kieso et al, 2002, pp.
19). However, accounting in the US has become so complicated that basic
accounting principles have become lost in details of specific accounting standards.
The popular press contains many stories of accounting and auditing scandals after
2001. Enron, WorldCom, Tyco International, Global Crossing, Quest
Communications, Xerox, and HealthSouth are just some of the major US firms
whose accounting practices and audits have made the news. When the US Congress
enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, many companies around the world reacted
and underwent appalling corporate upheavals and started to take a closer look at
the issue of earnings management, including Malaysian enterprises. Although the
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance and the Bursa Malaysia Listing
Requirements (2001) provides recommendations and rules to restore investor
confidence and to improve standards of corporate accountability, the creation of a
culture that subscribes to and adheres to best practices is still voluntary and lies
mostly with the board of directors and senior management (Dato’ Mohd Azlan
Hasim, 2003).
Malaysia has been an economically open country since its independence in
1957. However, its economic development model is distinctive whereby the country
abandons partially the laissez-faire style of economic management in favor of
greater state intervention. Under this system, government-linked companies (GLCs)
are established to play a significant role in economic development and these
companies are given a variety of supports to achieve the nation’s vision. In terms
of market capitalization, GLCs account for approximately 40% of the Composite
Index (CI) of Bursa Malaysia (Star, December 31, 2005). Outstanding shares of
these companies are substantially held by government-linked investment companies
(GLICs). They are Employees Provident Fund, Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera,
Lembaga Urusan Tabung Haji, Petroliam Nasional, Permodalan Nasional Berhad,
Minister of Finance Incorporated and Khazanah Nasional Berhad. Although the
government may not be the ultimate beneficial owner, it is able to appoint board
members, senior management, make major decisions such as contract awards and
restructuring and divestments.
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According to the Malaysian Statistics Department’s population estimates for
the third quarter of 2005, the country has a population of 25.6 million with the
Chinese ethnic group accounting for 6.1 million or 25.4% of the total. Although
Malaysia is not predominantly Chinese, Chinese-controlled firms have contributed
significantly to the economy (Selvanathan, 2000). According to Yeoh (1987), the
Malaysian Chinese style of management is usually closely liked with real or assumed
ancestral relationships and parochial sentiments. Employment is based mainly on
kinship ties and in the area of employer-employee relationships, paternalism and
unconditional loyalty take precedence over merit, experience, and educational
qualifications. The status quo has been gradually changed as entrepreneurs are
able to integrate Western management practices into their traditional Chinese
management approach (Selvanathan, 2000). Chinese family controlled companies
which are listed are private companies that are profit oriented and they use minimum
costs of production to produce maximum output. On the other hand, listed GLCs
have dual aspects, not only maximizing profit but also serving the community as a
whole. With various forms of protection and support from the government, their
management may not deem reducing cost of production as a priority. It is also
apparent that the sense of ownership will differ. This means that the motive for
earnings management will differ.
In view of the importance of corporate governance and the adverse effect of
earnings management, it is thus the objective of this research is to examine the
earnings management practices of GLCs and CFLCs listed in Bursa Saham.
Due to globalization and liberalization of world markets, competition faced
by GLCs and CFLCs become more and more intense and the pressure to perform
better is unavoidable. The findings of this research will not only enrich the field of
research pertaining to the relationship between managerial ownership and earnings
management, but more importantly, it raises public awareness of the earnings
management issue in Malaysia.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Managing earnings is the process of taking deliberate steps within the constraints
of generally accepted accounting principles to bring about a desired level of reported
earnings (Davidson, Stickney and Weil, 1987). Fischer and Rosenzweig (1995)
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provided a more precise definition as “behavior by managers to increase or decrease
current reported earnings of a firm without a corresponding increase or decrease
in long-term economic profitability.” The researcher uses the Fischer and
Rosenzweig definition. Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment
in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reporting to
either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of
the corporation or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported
accounting numbers (Healy and Wahlen, 1999, p.368).
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND MANAGERIAL
OWNERSHIP
Potential conflict arises where control is separated from equity ownership. This
conflict of interest has been explored by Jensen and Meckling (1976), who
developed a theory of the firm under agency arrangements. Managers are agents
for the shareholders and are required to act in their best interests. However, they
have operational control of the business and the shareholders receive little
information on whether the managers are acting in their best interest. On the other
hand, they also hypothesize that the larger the firm becomes, the larger its agency
problems because monitoring becomes more difficult and costly in a large firm.
 Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that managers have incentives to maximize their
own utility at the expense of shareholders’ wealth if they only have a small portion
of shareholdings within the firm. Managerial ownership can reduce agency costs
by aligning the interests of managers with those of shareholders (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976). Extending this study, Warfield et al (1995) argue that managers
are likely to engage in opportunistic activities and make aggressive accounting
choices within contractual constraints when managerial ownership is low.
In emerging markets such as China and Poland, weak governance creates a
unique set of agency concerns. Agency solutions in an efficient governance context
in most developed economies might not be effective within the weak governance
context of these economic entities (Holl and Kyriazis, 1997; Kochhar, 1996). In
Malaysia, concentrated ownership and significant government ownership in listed
firms (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Claessens et al., 2000) are issues which might
influence how managers and the board of directors govern their firms. On the
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other hand, family differences and role conflicts can lead to behavior that does not
support the best interests of the firm. Psychological conflict within the family can
create costs, ranging from sibling rivalry, autocratic behavior and nepotism, which
offset the benefits of reduced monitoring (Kets de Vries, 1993). In addition, family
emotions can also cloud financial vision in issues such as succession planning. It
is consistent with the research findings of    Morck and Yeung (2004).    He found
evidence that greater family ownership and control were associated with lower
profits during the Asian crisis of 1997.
Earnings Management and Compensation Plan
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) discuss the bonus plan hypothesis on the role
accounting choices play in management compensation plans. In addition to their
regular salaries, managers are frequently provided additional compensation based
on their performance. Net income in financial statements is often used to measure
their performance. Thus, managers have incentive to select accounting methods
and exercise discretion over accounting estimates to improve their compensation.
Early researchers interpreted this to mean that managers with income-based bonuses
had incentive to make income-increasing accounting choices. However, tests of
this hypothesis were inconclusive. Healy (1985) explains the inconsistencies as
being due to a failure to take into account the existence of upper and lower bounds
in many bonus plans. A more recent instance in which evidence of earnings
management has been found is by Dechow and Sloan (1991), who show that CEOs
increase their compensation in their final years in office by cutting research and
development (R&D) expenditures.
Earnings Management and Corporate Tax
Income tax is perhaps the most obvious motivation for earnings management.
Previous studies have suggested that firms choose accounting accruals to save tax
cost. Guenther et al. (1997) find that firms are forced to switch. for tax purposes,
from the cash method (low conformity) to the accrual method (high conformity)
deferred financial statement income. Maydew (1997) reports that firms with tax-
rate-based incentives shifted income in order to maximize current net operating
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losses. Nevertheless, taxation authorities tend to impose their own accounting rules
for calculation of taxable income, thereby reducing firms’ room to manipulate the
economic result. Consequently, taxation should not play a major role in earnings
management decisions in general. In Malaysia, all firms are taxed at the same
statutory rate. There is no minimum income tax. Presently, the corporate tax rate is
27%.
Earnings Management and Political Cost
Kim and Limpaphayom (1998) and, Derashid and Zhang (2003) find that large
Malaysian firms pay significantly lower effective taxes, calling into question the
applicability of the political cost hypothesis in the Malaysian context. Watts and
Zimmerman (1986) examine the role of accounting choices in the political process.
The political process imposes costs on firms or industries that are believed to be
taking advantage of the public and making excessive profits. Determination that
profits are excessive may result in pressure on these firms to reduce prices or face
strict regulations. Managers of these firms may thus have incentive to choose
accounting methods and use their discretion to reduce reported earnings and lower
their political risk. There is also evidence that banks manage their loan loss
provisions (Collins et al. 1995) and insurers manage claim loss reserves to meet
regulatory requirements (Adiel 1996).
Cultural Characteristics Effects on Accounting Disclosure and
Business Practice
The Malaysian capital market exhibits a unique corporate environment where its
economy offers clearly identifiable capital segments divided along ethnic lines
(Jesudason, 1989). After independence from the British in 1957, the government
initiated the New Economic Policy (NEP), which gradually adds Bumiputras into
the Malaysian capital market. The presence of clearly identifiable ethnic domination
of board membership and ownership of Malaysian listed companies is likely to
provide evidence of monitoring differences that may exist in these firms. Johnson
and Mitton (2003) and Gomez and Jomo (1997) argue that Bumiputera-controlled
firms and politically connected firms are perceived to have poor corporate
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governance practices and greater agency problems. On the other hand, both
Eichenseher (1995) and CheAhmad and Houghton (2001) suggest that Chinese
business practices may influence differences in levels of agency conflicts and risks
associated with Chinese-controlled firms at minimum level.
Chuah (1995) argues that the minds of Malaysian managers are influenced by
race, education and the type of organizations they work for. Using Hofstede’s
(1983) four dimensions (individualism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance,
and masculinity) in underlying the differences in the nation’s cultural values.
Abdullah (1992) provides evidence that the Malays are rated lower on individualism,
which is partly attributed to the fact that Islam emphasizes on groups and societies
rather than individuals (Baydoun and Willet, 1995). Using race and education as
surrogate for culture, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) find the Chinese to be more
individualistic and secretive in disclosure partly due to their entrepreneurial skills
which have a greater influence on the Malaysian economy. They, however, find
Malaysian firms dominated by Malay directors to have a higher level of voluntary
disclosure, which is consistent with Islamic business ethics which encourages
transparency in business, and thus there may be lesser tendency to manage earnings.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESIS
This paper investigates the extent to which listed GLCs and CFLCs manage their
reported earnings. The independent variable is shareholdings in government and
Chinese family controlled companies. The dependent variable will be the level of
earnings management as proxy by discretionary accruals derived from the modified
Jones model. The modified Jones model is used to capture the discretionary accruals
component which is a proxy for earnings management. This requires knowledge
of non-discretionary accruals and total accruals, because total accruals comprise
of a discretionary element and a non-discretionary element (Jones, 1991). The
non-discretionary element is essentially an accrual component imposed on
management by regulatory requirements such as Malaysian Accounting Standards
Board (MASB) and Financial Reporting Standards (FRS).
Past studies have shown that concentrated ownership can assist the board in
increasing its monitoring effectiveness (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) and in
terminating top executives in poor performing firms (Denis et al, 1997). With
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regards to earnings management, Chtourou et al. (2001) found that the firms with
low-level DAC have a percentage of shares owned by concentrated owners. In
Malaysia, since the corporate environment is different from the West, this hypothesis
might not hold. In this paper, ownership is determined by the percentage of the
largest shareholder out of total equity, either through direct or indirect interest, as
shown in the Register of Substantial Shareholders of firms’ annual reports. The
largest shareholder of GLCs is either one of 7 GLICs, state governments, other
government institutions or a combination. In contrast, the largest shareholder of
Chinese family controlled companies is a chief executive officer (CEO) or a director
sitting on the board, who has blood relationship with the founder or CEO. He also
holds sizeable ownership equity of the firm to gain control of the group of
companies.
In compliance with the Companies Act 1965, all listed firms have to disclose
their substantial shareholders, including their 30 largest shareholders, in their annual
reports. The GLCs and Chinese families’ shareholding percentages are based on
the 30 largest shareholders that accounting for direct interest. Most family businesses
however, retain control by holding shares indirectly. In this study, we compute the
percentage of controlling interest based on analysis of the 30 largest shareholders
and the disclosure in the analysis of substantial shareholders as direct and indirect
interest of a director in a group. To achieve the objectives of this study, we test the
following 2 hypotheses as shown below.
H01: There is no difference between GLCs and CFC companies in their earnings
management.
H02: The concentration of shareholdings does not affect the level of earnings
management.
In this study, discretionary accruals (DAC) are determined by using total
accruals minus non-discretionary elements. The process of determining DAC is
illustrated below (see Table 1). In order to test the 2 hypotheses above, t-test and
simple regressions are used. From the linear regressions, we examine the
relationship between DAC and ownership concentration (OC). The regression
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Table 1 Variable Definitions and Computations
Variables                                         Description
Dependent Variable
Discretionary Accruals Determined according to the modified Jones model:
TACit/TAit-1 = a0j (1/TAit-1) + a1j (REVit – RECit)/TAit-1
+ a2j (PPEit/TAit-1) + eit, where
TACit = Total accruals [net profit before extraordinary items
minus net cash generated from (used in) operating
activities] in year t for the i’th control firm;
TAit = Total assets in year t for the i’th control firm;
REVit = The change in revenues and operating income from
year t-1 to year t for the i’th control firm;
RECit = The change in receivables from year t-1 to year t for
the i’th control firm;
PPEit = Gross property, plant, and equipment in year t for
the i’th control firm;
eit  = The regression error terms, assumed cross-
sectionally uncorrelated and normally distributed
with mean zero.
The estimated coefficients from the control-firm regressions
above are then used to estimate the level of managed accruals
for each sample firm by subtracting the estimate of unmanaged
accruals from total accruals as follow:
TAEMj,t = TACjt/TAjt-1 – a0j (1/TAjt-1) – a1j (REVjt – RECjt)
TAjt-1 – a2j (PPEjt/TAjt-1), where
TAEMj,t or DAC is the managed component of total accruals for
sample firm j in year t, which is equal to discretionary total
accruals, and all other variables are as previously determined.
Dependent Variable
Managerial Ownership GLC is determined by measuring % of the largest shareholders
out of total equity either through direct or indirect interest of
shareholding.    The largest shareholder is    either 7 GLICs, state
governments, other government institutions or a combination
Chinese family businesses are determined by measuring % of
the largest shareholder out of total equity either through direct
or indirect interest. The largest shareholder is a CEO/director
on the board who has blood relationship with founder/CEO, at
the same time he holds sizeable ownership equity
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equation for the second hypothesis is DAC = a + bOC. It is expected that the
coefficient of OC is positive and significant.
SAMPLE SELECTION
This study uses secondary data from annual reports of publicly quoted companies.
Finance-related companies are included although they have unique characteristics
and different compliance and regulatory requirements. These annual reports are
available and downloadable from the web site of the exchange (http://
annoucements.bursamalaysia.com). Notably, since not all firms have financial year
end (FYE) on the same date, the data selection would comprise period of FYE
March 31, 2004 to March 31, 2006 although majority of companies’ FYE fall in
December 31, 2004 and December 31, 2005.
Twenty five companies from each ownership structure were selected from the
100 indexed companies of CI in Bursa Malaysia. Notably, successful Chinese
entrepreneurx have a few publicly quoted companies in Malaysia concurrently.
For instance, Kuok Brothers have 3 listed companies in CI, namely PPB Group
Berhad, Shangri-la Hotels (M) Berhad and Transmile Group Berhad. Tan Sri
William Cheng has 2 listed corporations - Lion Corporation Berhad and Lion
Industries Corporation Berhad. The Malaysian operations of the Singapore-based
Quek family’s Hong Leong Co. is controlled by Tan Sri Quek Ling Chan who has
2 publicly quoted companies, OYL Industries Berhad and Malaysian Pacific
Industries Berhad. This may pose a problem to the results as the same family could
be over-represented.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Table 2 shows the absolute mean and standard deviation of earnings management
by ownership for years 2004 and 2005. The results indicate that GLCs appear to
have higher level of earnings management and dispersion among themselves as
compared to CFLCs, for both years. More than half (52%) of the sample GLCs
managed their earnings upwards in both years. Sixty percent and 64 per cent of
CFLCs managed their earnings downwards for the years 2004 and 2005
respectively. (See appendix 2).
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The disparity in the direction of earnings management could be attributed to
the motives of management. The motive of GLCs to manage reported earnings is
related to compensation plans. Unlike owner-managers who have to risk their own
resources, GLC managers are using public funds as their major resources. In
addition, given that these firms normally tie executive compensation to accounting
results such as return on assets or earnings per share, thus, it should come as no
surprise that top management attempts to manage the accounting numbers to
maximize their compensations. On the other hand, the motive of CFLCs might be
attributed to tax related issues. These firms are profit oriented and the management
will minimize cost to maximize output. Their destiny is solely in the hands of
management. They are highly motivated to minimize the taxable income so as to
reduce taxes paid to the government and improve cash flows of the company.
Corporate taxation is deemed to be expensive but avoidable in that it must be paid
annually, although the tax rate has been reducing if compared to 10 years ago.
To determine whether there is any difference between the two ownership
structures in terms of their earnings management, t-test was conducted and the
results are shown in Table 3. The test results demonstrate that there is a significant
Table 2 Distribution of Earnings Management by
Ownership
Year Mean Standard Deviation
(%) (%)
GLCs 2004 4.19 3.96
2005 6.03 7.91
Chinese 2004 1.73 1.46
Family Controlled 2005 3.24 2.85
Table 3 Result for Paired T-Test
t-value Sig
DAC of GLCs and
DAC of Chinese Family Business 5.188 0.000
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difference between the two ownership structures in earnings management. This is
indicated by the t-value of 5.188 which is highly significant, at 0.01 level. Thus,
the hypothesis 1 is rejected and we conclude that earnings management among the
GLCs is more prevalent than in CFLCs.
Table 4 shows the regression results using panel data. The objective of these
regression analyses is to investigate whether the concentration of shareholding
affects the degree of earnings management. The results show that there is a negative
relationship between concentration of shareholdings and earnings management in
GLCs. The concentration of shareholdings appears to have little impact on earnings
management. This is indicated by the coefficient of shareholding with a value of -
0.043 which is significant at 0.10 level. As for the CFCCs, the shareholding
concentration does not have any effect on earnings management.
 Table 4 Regression Result for Panel Data
Coefficients T Sig. R2 F
Beta
GLCs -0.0.043 -1.803* 0.078 0.063 3.252
CFCCs 0.015 0.308 0.759 0.002 0.095
The weak and negative relationship between shareholding concentration and
earnings management observed in GLCs is inconsistent with the political cost
hypothesis by Watts and Zimmerman (1986). They postulate that management
could choose accounting methods and use their discretion to minimize political
impact at certain levels. Further, the result is also inconsistent with the study done
by Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988). They argue that larger ownership would
provide management with greater scope for opportunistic behaviors. However,
the findings are in line with Warfield et al (1995). They argue that the higher the
portion of managerial ownership, the lower the magnitude of discretionary
accounting accruals adjustment. It could be that, the higher the proportion of
ownership, the higher the political pressure to be more transparent and higher
corporate governance expected. This makes earnings management more difficult
and risky to practice as the spotlight is on management.
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As for CFLCs, the coefficient of ownership concentration is insignificant.
The result does not support models that predict that higher ownership concentration
results in higher earnings management. The low level of earnings management
which is not related to shareholding concentration could be due to the fact that the
top management of CFLCs possesses a high degree of financial and business risk
awareness, particularly after the 1997 financial crisis.
SUMMARY
The objective of this paper is to examine the relationship between earnings
management and two ownership structures, GLCs and CFLCs. The findings indicate
that there is a tendency for GLCs to manage their reported earnings upwards while
the CFLCs managed their earnings downwards. The prediction made about
managerial ownership influencing opportunistic earnings management activity was
found to be inaccurate.
From the regression results, it is found that ownership concentration is
negatively related to earnings management but insignificant at the 0.05 level. It
contradicts agency theory on the grounds that alignment of managerial obligations
and ownership could influence top management to minimize the practice of earnings
management. However, there is no substantial evidence in the findings to prove
that the theory can be rebutted as only one variable is taken into account in
examining the relationship in this study.
The belief is that Malays have a lower rating on individualism as compared to
the Chinese, as Islam reinforces groups and societies rather than individuals, thus
encouraging transparency in business and leading to lesser tendency to manage
earnings. As Malaysia is in pursuit of a knowledge-based economy, the need for
survival in a competitive environment has also led the Malays and not only the
Chinese to be more individualistic. The findings indicate that the difference in
racial ownership is not a factor that has any apparent crucial effect on earnings
management. This mistaken impression must be withdrawn in this new millennium.
This research is perhaps useful to business corporations and policy makers.
This is because literature published on earnings management in the Malaysian
context is insufficient and thus unable to help determine how serious this practice
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is among the different ownership structures. Additionally, the findings will
definitely create public awareness on the extent of earnings management.
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Appendix 1
1 Astro ALL Asia Networks Berhad 1 Berjaya Sports Toto Bhd
2 Bintulu Ports Holdings Bhd 2 Globetronics Technology Bhd
3 Bursa Malaysia Bhd 3 Genting Bhd
4 Chemical Company Malaysia Bhd 4 IGB Corporation Bhd
5 DRB-Hicom Bhd 5 IOI Corporation Bhd
6 Guthrie Ropel Bhd 6 Jaya Tiasa Holdings Bhd
7 Golden Hope Plantations Bhd 7 Kian Joo Can Factory Bhd
8 Island & Peninsular Bhd 8 Kim Hin Industry Bhd
9 Malaysian Airline System Bhd 9 Kuala Lumpur Kepong Bhd
10 MIDF Bhd 10 Lion Corporation Bhd
11 Malayan Banking Bhd 11 Lion Industries Corporation Bhd
12 Malaysia Airport Holdings Bhd 12 Malaysian Pacific Industries Bhd
13 NCB Holdings Bhd 13 Magnum Corporation Bhd
14 Petronas Dagangan Bhd 14 OYL Industries Bhd
15 Petrronas Gas Bhd 15 PPB Group Bhd
16 PLUS Expressways Bhd 16 Shangri-la Hotels (M) Bhd
17 POS Malaysia & S. Holdings Bhd 17 Selangor Properties Bhd
17 Proton Holdings Bhd 18 Tan Chong Motor Holdings Bhd
19 Sarawak Enterprise Corp’ Bhd 19 TA Enterprise Bhd
20 Sime Darby Bhd 20 Top Glove Corporation Bhd
21 Telekom Malaysia Bhd 21 Transmile Group Bhd
22 Tenega Malaysia Bhd 22 UCHI Technologies Bhd
23 Time Engineering Bhd 23 Unisem (M) Bhd
24 UDA Holdings Bhd 24 WTK Holdings Bhd
25 UMW Holdings Bhd 25 YTL Corporation Bhd
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Appendix 2
                      2004                       2005
Island & Peninsular Bhd 18.01% MIDF Bhd 17.40%
Sime Darby Bhd 8.17% POS Malaysia & S. Holdings Bhd 10.38%
Bursa Malaysia Bhd 6.15% Bursa Malaysia Bhd 9.16%
Telekom Malaysia Bhd 3.72% Proton Holdings Bhd 8.09%
Golden Hope Plantations Bhd 2.60% Golden Hope Plantations Bhd 6.67%
Guthrie Ropel Bhd 2.40% Chemical Company Malaysia Bhd 5.81%
Time Engineering Bhd 2.04% Guthrie Ropel Bhd 5.12%
Chemical Company Malaysia Bhd 2.00% Bintulu Ports Holdings Bhd 4.39%
Proton Holdings Bhd 1.87% Sime Darby Bhd 4.22%
Malayan Banking Bhd 1.69% Malayan Banking Bhd 2.99%
Astro All Asia Network Bhd 1.53% Petronas Dagangan Bhd 0.71%
DRB-Hicom Bhd 0.97% Island & Peninsular Bhd 0.24%
PLUS Expressways Bhd 0.95% UDA Holdings Bhd 0.18%
Bintulu Ports Holding Bhd 0.02% Malaysia Airport Holdings Bhd -0.10%
Tenega Malaysia Bhd -0.38% PLUS Expressways Bhd -0.20%
Sarawak Enterprise Corp’ Bhd -1.63% DRB-Hicom Bhd -0.46%
Malaysia Airport Holdings Bhd -2.15% NCB Holdings Bhd -1.39%
UMW Holdings Bhd -3.91% Malaysian Airline System Bhd -2.90%
Petrronas Gas Bhd -4.07% Astro All Asia Network Bhd -3.17%
POS Malaysia & S. Holdings Bhd -4.81% Sarawak Enterprise Corp’ Bhd -3.69%
NCB Holdings Bhd -4.92% Tenega Malaysia Bhd -4.22%
Petronas Dagangan Bhd -5.48% Petronas Gas Bhd -5.88%
UDA Holdings Bhd -6.88% UMW Holdings Bhd -6.20%
MIDF Bhd -7.15% Telekom Malaysia Bhd -8.50%
Malaysian Airline System Bhd -11.17% Time Engineering Bhd -38.75%
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                       2004                        2005
Tan Chong Motor Holdings Bhd 16.48% Tan Chong Motor Holdings Bhd 18.76%
Kian Joo Can Factory Bhd 4.77% Kian Joo Can Factory Bhd 10.13%
Globetronics Technology Bhd 4.16% Transmile Group Bhd 8.02%
Lion Industries Corporation Bhd 3.05% Kim Hin Industry Bhd 5.14%
TA Enterprise Berhad 2.32% Kuala Lumpur Kepong Bhd 4.48%
IGB Corporation Bhd 2.00% Lion Industries Corporation Bhd 4.21%
PPB Group Bhd 0.97% OYL Industries Bhd 2.27%
Kuala Lumpur Kepong Bhd 0.35% Top Glove Corporation Bhd 1.83%
Jaya Tiasa Holdings Bhd 0.29% UCHI Technologies Bhd 0.04%
WTK Holdings Bhd 0.09% IOI Corporation Bhd -0.05%
Unisem (M) Bhd -0.06% IGB Corporation Bhd -0.51%
Kim Hin Industry Bhd -0.32% Berjaya Sports Toto Bhd -0.54%
Malaysian Pacific Industries Bhd -0.63% Lion Corporation Bhd -1.21%
YTL Corporation Bhd -0.95% YTL Corporation Bhd -1.64%
IOI Corporation Bhd -1.26% PPB Group Bhd -1.66%
UCHI Technologies Bhd -1.84% Selangor Properties Bhd -1.96%
Selangor Properties Bhd -1.89% WTK Holdings Bhd -2.15%
Berjaya Sports Toto Bhd -2.15% Shangri-la Hotels (M) Bhd -3.41%
Transmile Group Bhd -2.19% TA Enterprise Bhd -3.55%
Lion Corporation Bhd -3.14% Magnum Corporation Bhd -3.56%
OYL Industries Bhd -3.20% Genting Bhd -4.36%
Top Glove Corporation Bhd -3.60% Unisem (M) Bhd -4.57%
Genting Bhd -3.97% Jaya Tiasa Holdings Bhd -6.94%
Shangri-la Hotels (M) Bhd -4.05% Globetronics Technology Bhd -8.41%
Magnum Corporation Bhd -4.65% Malaysian Pacific Industries Bhd -10.73%
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